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his paper explores a novel form ofMental Fictionalism: Fictionalism about talk of
neural representations in cognitive science. his type of Fictionalism promises to
(i) avoid the hard problem of naturalising representations, without (ii) incurring the
high costs of eliminating useful representation talk. In this paper, I motivate and
articulate this form of Fictionalism, and show that, despite its apparent advantages, it
faces two serious objections. hese objections are: (1) Fictionalism about talk of neural
representations ultimately does not avoid the problem of naturalising representations;
(2) Fictional representations cannot play the explanatory role required by cognitive
science.
1 Introduction
his paper articulates and explores anovel formofMental Fictionalism: Fictionalism
about the neural representations posited by cognitive science. Cognitive science ap-
pears to be committed to neural representations. hese representations are claimed
to be the springs of our thought and action: they drive our behaviour, determ-
ine our thoughts,memories, and inferences. However, despite the central role of
neural representations in cognitive science, it is hard to explain what is meant by
‘representation’ in a way that does not incur problematic commitments. he rep-
resentations in question clearly cannot be conventional representations that gain
their representational content and status through our social conventions; for we are
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rarely aware that such representations exist, and no adequate social conventions
regarding them appear to be in play. he standard reply is that neural representa-
tions are representations of a diòerent sort: original or natural representations. his
class of representations gain their representational status independently of, and in
some sense prior to, our social conventions. But what is a natural representation?
Attempts to answer this question—naturalising representation—have been on-going
since the 1970s. Unfortunately, this project to date has been largely unsuccessful.
Many contemporary theorists are sceptical that an adequate naturalistic theory of
representation will ever emerge.
For this reason, some theorists have been drawn to Eliminativism about talk of
neural representations in cognitive science.¹ If cognitive science could stop appeal-
ing to neural representations, then there would be no need to give an account of
representation, and therefore no need to give a naturalistic account. However, thor-
oughgoing Eliminativism about neural-representation talk is a hard road to follow.
Although some cognitive phenomena can be explained in non-representational
terms other aspects of cognition appear stubbornly resistant to non-representational
explanation. Attributing neural representations seems to be the best way to explain
many of our cognitive abilities.²
Cognitive science appears to face a dilemma: either it uses neural-representation
talk and is lumbered with the task of naturalising representation, or a radical and
undesirable revision to the practice of cognitive science is required.
Neural Representation Fictionalism (NRF) oòers a neat way out. NRF opens up
a third option: allowing us to use neural-representation talk in cognitive science
without the cost of naturalising representation. NRF promises to rid us of one of the
biggest problems facing representation talk in cognitive science without the pain
required by Eliminativism. NRF purports to deliver the beneûts of both Realism
and Eliminativism with the costs of neither. he only downside of NRF is that it
would require us to reinterpret neural-representation talk in cognitive science in
a ûctionalist way. At least on the face of it, it is not obvious that this is not a price
worth paying. NRF seems worth exploring.
Fictionalism about a given discourse is the view that claims C in that discourse
involve genuine statements of fact—they aim to describe theworld—but, in contrast
to Realism, those claims C do not aim at truth. Instead, they serve some other
purpose. A ûctionalist might remain agnostic about the truth value of her claims C
(as van Fraassen (1980) does), or shemay declare that the claims C are literally false
in spite of their cognitive value (as do Nolan, Restall andWest (2005)).
1. For example, see Beer (1995); Brooks (1991); Keijzer (1998); van Gelder (1995).
2. For example, see Bechtel (1998); Clark and Toribio (1994); Grush (2003); Markman and
Dietrich (2000); Ramsey (2007).
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Fictionalism ofmany stripes has become popular in recent years. Forms of Fiction-
alism have been developed for mathematical discourse, moral discourse, modal
discourse, and negative existential talk. In each case, themotivation bears a striking
resemblance to the problem facing cognitive science above. We have a practice—
mathematical talk,moral talk,modal talk, or negative existential talk—that appears
to commit us to the existence of troublesome entities—numbers,moral facts, pos-
sible worlds, non-existent objects. Attempts to explain how these entities ût into the
physical world face serious challenges. However, dispensing with the entities by
eliminating talk of them is not attractive either, since talking about them appears
essential for us to achieve our ends. According to the Fictionalist, the relevant
discourse should be understood as a ûction; the ûction plays a similar cognitive
role in our lives to that which was thought to be played by the truth, but it does not
carry a commitment to the existence of the relevant entities. Fictionalism would
allow us to talk like a Realist but without incurring the ontological commitments.
NRF is an instance of a broader form of Fictionalism: Mental Fictionalism. Psy-
chological talk is rife with troublesome ontological commitments and seems to be
potentially fertile ground for developing forms of Fictionalism. Demeter (2009;
2009; 2010) andWallace (2007) explore Fictionalism about Folk Psychology. On
their view, Folk Psychology is false, but useful for prediction, understanding, and
normative evaluation. Dennett (1991; 2002) develops a form of Fictionalism avant
la lettre about talk of conscious experience. According to Dennett, talk of conscious
experience is false but useful because it allows us to talk concisely about complex
disjunctions of physical properties such as colours. Dennett (1991) also defends a
form of Fictionalism about the self: such talk serves a useful purpose by allowing
us to better plan and coordinate our action.
My intention in this paper is to explore Fictionalism about neural-representation
talk in cognitive science. his by necessity can only be a preliminary scouting, but it
at least indicates the general shape the viewmust take and themain challenges that
it faces. he plan for the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the general
Fictionalist framework. In Section 3, I describe the kind of neural-representation
talk in cognitive science that NRF will target. In Section 4, I state NRF and canvas
NRF’s beneûts. In Section 5, I argue that, despite its beneûts, NRF faces two serious
objections. hese objections are that: (1) NRF does not, in the end, avoid the
problem of naturalising representation; (2) NRF cannot adequately serve cognitive
science because ûctional neural representations cannot play the explanatory role
required by cognitive science.
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2 Fictionalism
he central notion of Fictionalism is that of ontological commitment.³ Ontological
commitment is the idea that some of our practices, and, in particular, our linguistic
practice when we give our best description of the world, commit us to the existence
of certain entities. If our best description of the world contains reference to Xs,
then we are committed, on the face of it, to the existence of Xs. Correspondingly, if
we want to know which entities exist, we should start by looking at the ontological
commitments of our best theories.
he notion of ontological commitment has been hugely inuential in contemporary
metaphysics. he precise details of the notion are controversial, but the basic
idea—that our best description of the world commits us to an ontology—is widely
accepted.
If one accepts this basic idea, problems quickly begin to emerge. Consider the
following claims:
1. 2 + 2 = 4
2. Torture is wrong.
3. he course of biological evolution could have been diòerent.
4. Phlogiston does not exist.
We typically take all these claims to be fact stating and true. Claims (1–4) are uttered
with all sincerity, and they ûgure in, or are entailments of, our best descriptions
of the world. Yet if (1–4) are both fact stating and true, then on the face of it they
commit us to a range of entities: numbers,moral facts,modal facts, and non-existent
entities. hese entities pose a number of well-known and daunting challenges,
including explaining how the entities ût into a physical world, how agents like
ourselves can have knowledge of them, and how agents like ourselves can refer
to them. hese problems have promptedmany philosophers to doubt whether a
Realist interpretation of the relevant discourse is the best strategy. An alternative is
Eliminativism: onemay say that (1–4) should not be asserted by our best theories.
Talk of numbers, moral facts, modal facts, and non-existent entities should be
eliminated from serious fact-stating talk. However, Eliminativism also faces well-
known problems. It is hard to eliminatemathematical,moral,modal, or negative
existential talk while still allowing us to achieve our ends.
Fictionalism appears to oòer an easier way out. he Fictionalist starts from the
observation that we oen engage in serious fact-stating talk without incurring
3. Quine (1960, 1980).
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ontological commitments. Common examples come from ûgurative language. As
Yablo (1998) says, ‘not even Quine considers it ontologically committing to say in a
ûgurative vein that there are Xs’ (p. 233). A ûgurative assertion may be fact stating
(e.g. ‘Nothing getsmy goat asmuch as chewing gum in class’)without the ontological
commitment that a literal assertion would normally bring (i.e. no commitment
to the existence of a goat). Figurative language can be understood to include a
range of linguistic devices that use fact-stating language for non-truth-stating ends,
including metaphor, hyperbole, pretence, and supposition.
A notable property of ûgurative language is that even if ûgurative claims are false,
theymay nonetheless possess signiûcant cognitive value. One value of ûgurative lan-
guage is that it provides an alternativeway of expressing claims than literal assertion.
But the beneûts of ûgurative language go beyondmerely being an alternativemech-
anism for expressing claims that could have been statedmore plainly. Figurative
language oen functions as a powerful inferential device: it prompts us to engage
in a range of appropriate and useful inferences (e.g. ‘Jimi is on ûre today’ primes a
range of inferences about how Jimi will perform and react). Figurative language
can provide a concise description where a literal description is too long-winded or
simply unavailable (e.g. ‘she gave him a piercing glance’). Figurative language can
provide us with models with which to make sense of the world (e.g. Romeo saying
that ‘Juliet is the sun’ provides us with a model to understand Romeo’s thoughts
and behaviour). Figurative language can simplify the world in helpful ways by
the use of pretence (e.g. ‘water is an incompressible uid’). Figurative language
is also a particularly apt ût for human psychology; it tends to ‘stick’ in our minds
and inspire future enquiry in a way that literal language rarely achieves (e.g. ‘the
clockwork universe’). Figurative language allows us to describe complex situations
concisely in a way that is pregnant with appropriate inferences and understanding.
It is not diõcult to see why this is something that we value. he cognitive virtues of
ûgurative languagemay outweigh the vice of introducing literal falsehood into our
best description of the world.
3 Neural representations
Neural representations play an important role in cognitive science. Cognitive science
oen ascribes neural representations when certain brain regions or individual
neurons of an animal are demonstrated to respond strongly, and selectively, to
certain stimuli. Activity in those brain regions or individual neurons is taken to
represent those stimuli. he representations in question are sub-personal: they are
attributed to parts of the animal (brain regions and neurons), not to the animal as a
whole (e.g. as beliefs, desires, and thoughts would be). he neural representations
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are oen non-conscious: the animal is unable on the basis of conscious reection
alone to know that it has them. he neural representations are also oen assumed
to bemore fundamental than, and to somehow ground, the animal’s conscious and
personal-level thought. We will return to this grounding claim in Section 5. What
concerns us here is that—independent of its use in a grounding claim—neural-
representation talk is used by cognitive science to explain animal behaviour.
Cognitive science appeals to the fact that an animal represents its environment
using neural activity to explain why the animal succeeds in its environment. Neural
representations that are appropriate to an animal’s environment explain why the
animal is successful. he animal is successful because it consults an internal model
that predictswhatwill happen in the environment, and themodel guides the animal’s
action accordingly. Neural representations and the animal’s sub-personal inferences
over those neural representations explain the animal’s success. Just as the use of
amap of the London Underground explains the success of a visitor to London in
navigating around the city, so the use of appropriate neural representations explains
the success of an animal in dealing with its environment. Unsuccessful behaviour
can be explained by the animal having the wrong neural representations. If false or
inappropriate neural representations are deployed by the animal, one would expect
systematic mistakes in behaviour. Numerous errors in animal behaviour can be
rendered comprehensible if one understands the animal acting ‘as if ’ a stimulus
were present. Similarly, systematic wrong turns taken by a visitor to London can be
explained if we discover that the visitor is using an incorrect map.
he role of neural representations is not conûned to explaining behaviour. Neural
representations also play a role in explaining oò-line cognitive phenomena such
as memory, imagery, anticipation, and prediction. Neural representations explain
how animals are able to think, recall, and perform inferences about a stimulus in
the absence of that stimulus. Neural representations also explain the systematic de-
pendence between on-line and oò-line cognition: intervening on one systematically
intervenes on the other in a way that is sensitive to representational content. Simil-
arly, a visitor to London can think about, andmodify, her map of the Underground
in her hotel room, and this will aòect, in systematic ways, how that map guides her
future behaviour.
Neural representations are not the only tool to explain behaviour and cognition.
In some contexts, alternative forms of explanation are preferable. However, neural
representations play amajor role in cognitive science; they animate our best accounts
of our cognitive capacities. Neural representations feature in the description of
cognitivemechanisms, in the speciûcation of the causes of thought and behaviour,
in the explanation of behaviour and thought, and in prediction and intervention
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concerning the cognitive life of animals.4
Neural representations are ascribed to animals at almost every stage in their cognit-
ive processing, from low-level sensory andmotor processing to high-level planning
and inference. One of themost famous discoveries about themammalian visual
system is selectivity of response of cells in the early visual cortex (Hubel andWiesel
1962). Certain neurons respond to certain characteristic stimuli (bars of particular
orientations) more strongly than others. his suggests that neural activity carries
information about, and is used by the brain to represent, some features of the world
(e.g. lines and edges). Recent work on the visual cortex has focused on determining
the nature of these representations, which stimuli various neurons are responsive
to, how their response is optimised to eõciently represent natural environments,
and the sensitivity of their response to top-down inuences (Chirimuuta and Gold
2009; Pasupathy and Connor 2001; Simoncelli and Olshausen 2001). Similar kinds
of response-selectivity has been observed in the primary auditory cortex (Schriener,
Read and Sutter 2000).
Cells in the inferior temporal cortex are selectively responsive to more complex
environmental categories (faces, hands, and human bodies) in away that is invariant
to changes in stimulus size, contrast, colour and exact location on the retina (Kan-
wisher,McDermott and Chun 1997; Logothetis and Sheinberg 1996). Some cells
appear to be highly speciûc in their response: tuned to particular emotional expres-
sions, direction of eye gaze, or particular people (Perrett et al. 1985; Quian Quiroga
et al. 2005). heir selective response appears to play a role in visual categorisation,
learning, andmemory (Milner and Goodale 2006). Activity in these areas is shared
between on-line interactions with environmental stimuli and oò-line experience
such as visual imagery and hallucination (Albright 2012).
Neural representations play amajor role in understanding memory and learning.
One aspect ofmemory and learning that has received particular attention is spatial
learning. Some neurons in the rat hippocampus are selectively responsive to spatial
locations in certain environments (place cells), others are selectively responsive to
head direction (direction cells), others in the primate hippocampus are selectively re-
sponsive to particular regions of space falling into the ûeld of view (spatial-view cells)
(Moser, Kropò andMoser 2008). Learning andmemory are explained by long-term
storage of, and associations between, these neural representations (Eichenbaum
2004).
he prefrontal cortex seems to be the primary neural basis of working memory;
working memory holds an object briey ‘in mind’ when it is no longer visible. he
prefrontal cortex is important for decision-making taskswhen, for example, animals
4. See, for example,Nicolelis and Lebedev (2009) on using motor neural representations to drive
prosthetic limbs.
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have to make a decision about an absent stimulus, or a stimulus that has not yet
occurred (Miller, Erickson and Desimone 1996). Neural representations are the
standard way to understand how this decision-making works: working memory
involves themanipulation of neural representations, which can be present even if
the stimuli they represent are absent (Miller and Cohen 2001).
Explanations of how humans understand each other oen posit representations of
the self, other humans, and belief and desire-like states of those humans. Recent
attention has focused on identifying the neural basis of these representations. One
inuential suggestion is that they are based, in part, on the representations aòorded
bymirror neurons—neurons which ûre when an animal acts and when the animal
observes the same action being performed by another animal (Gallese 2007). Neural
representations relevant to social cognition appear to be located in themedial frontal
cortex (Amodio and Frith 2006).
Neural representations are also involved in motor activity and motor learning.
heories of these domains posit two types of neural representations: forwardmodels
are representations of the body that predict the sensory consequences of a given
action allowing the animal to form quick anticipatory responses and cancel self-
generated sensory signals; inverse models represent the body in a diòerent way,
allowing the animal to infer which motor commands to send to achieve a desired
bodily position from its current state (Miall andWolpert 1996). Flexible, rapid,
and robust motor activity is explained by forward and inversemodels working in
tandem (Wolpert and Kawato 1998). he neural location of forward and inverse
motor models is not yet established, but both are suspected to lie in the cerebellum
(Cerminara, Apps andMarple-Horvat 2009; Wolpert,Miall and Kawato 1998).
4 Neural Representation Fictionalism (NRF)
Neural representations feature heavily in cognitive science. We saw in Section 2 that
if our best description of the world contains ineliminable reference to Xs, then we
are committed to the existence of Xs. Cognitive science appears to be committed to
the existence of neural representations.
his raises a problem. How do neural representations ût into the physical world?
What elevates certain neural states to be representations?
Two tempting answers have to be avoided. First, it cannot be our social conventions
that make a neural state a representation. Social conventions appear to be why
many familiar public external representations—written language in English, signs,
diagrams, the London Underground map—are representations. hese count as
representations because we adopt the social convention that certain marks on the
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page represent certain states of aòairs. However, this cannot be true of neural repres-
entations. No appropriate social conventions are in play for neural representations
to elevate them to representational status. Oen we do not know which neural
states represent, or what they represent. It is understood as cognitive science’s job
to discover the relevant neural representations, not to stipulate representational
conventions, or search for hidden conventions in the social domain.
Second, it cannot merely be the response-selectivity of a neural state to a given
stimulus that makes it a representation of that stimulus. As noted in Section 3,
response-selectivity is oen used to justify attribution of a neural representation.
However, response-selectivity by itself cannot be what makes a physical state a
representation. Many physical states have response-selectivity but are not represent-
ations, and representations may occurwithout reliable response-selectivity (Ramsey
2007).
Neural representations must gain their representational status in a diòerent way
from conventional representations, and they cannot gain it from response-selectivity
alone. Neural representations are claimed to achieve this feat by being natural repres-
entations. Natural representations gain their representational status independently
of, and prior to, our social conventions. Since the 1970s, a great deal of attention has
focused on trying to give a theory of natural representation. Accounts of natural
representation oen start with a simple response-selectivity condition and supple-
ment or modify it with extra conditions in an eòort to overcome its problems.5
Unfortunately, and despite a large investment of eòort, an adequate theory of natural
representation not been forthcoming. Many contemporary philosophers suspect
that representation simply cannot be naturalised.6
here appear to be two options. First, hard-headed Realism. We can continue to
assume that neural-representation talk is, as it appears to be, true, fact stating, and an
ineliminable part of cognitive science. We accept that this entails a commitment to
the existence ofneural representations. However,we adopt anoptimistic attitude and
assume that the project ofnaturalising neural representationswill eventually succeed.
No account has succeeded so far, but perhaps an adequate account will be found.
Second, Eliminativism. We excise neural-representation talk from serious fact-
stating discourse in cognitive science. his may involve junking the entire approach
that uses neural representations to explain cognition described in Section 3 (Beer
1995). Or, itmay involve preserving neural-representation talk but quarantining it as
an ‘informal gloss’ that can be safely paraphrased away when we ascend to the level
of serious fact-stating talk (Chomsky 1995; Egan 2003). he cost of Eliminativism is
5. See Dretske (1981, 1995); Fodor (1990); Millikan (1984).
6. Concerns have come from a wide range of sources, with some principled worries coming
from Kripke (1982); Loewer (1997); Putnam (1981); Ramsey (2007).
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that requires painful revision to existing practice in cognitive science. Talking about
neural representations is extremely useful; it is hard to eliminate, or paraphrase it
away, and still achieve our ends.
Realism and Eliminativism are themain roads traveled. Realism lumbers us with
the task of naturalising representation. Eliminativism requires painful revision to
cognitive science. In this section, I propose a third option: Neural Representation
Fictionalism.
What is Neural Representation Fictionalism (NRF)? According to NRF, neural-
representation talk is false but serves an important purpose and, for that reason,
should be preserved. NRF claims that neural-representation talk in cognitive science
is perfectly in order and cannot, and should not, be eliminated or paraphrased away
from serious fact-stating language. However, neural-representation talk does not
bring with it any commitment to the existence of neural representations since it
is understood as systematically false. Talking about neural representations is a
useful device for cognitive science, but no more ontologically committing than
talking about water as a continuous incompressible uid is in uid dynamics. his
distinguishes NRF from Realism. What distinguishes NRF from Eliminativism is
that a Fictionalist interpretation of neural-representation talk is claimed to yield
similar goods for cognitive science as Realism—explanatory, descriptive, causal,
and instrumental goods. he intention of NRF is to allow us to reap the beneûts of
Realism without Realism’s ontological costs.
According to NRF, statements of the following form are false:
5. Neuron/brain region activity X represents Y .
However, statements of form (5) nevertheless serve a useful purpose and are fact
stating. NRF is likely to endorse statements that are related to (5) but which concern
a ûction. Precisely how to state these claims depends on the details of the version
of NRF being employed (see below). NRF is likely, however, to endorse something
like the following:
6. In the Neural Representation Fiction, neuron/brain region activity X repres-
ents Y .
Where the Neural Representation Fiction is the practice that attributes neural repres-
entations to the brain. According to NRF, the following claims are false:
a. Some neural activity in V1 represents edges and lines.
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b. Some neural activity in the fusiform gyrus area represents faces.
c. Some neural activity in the hippocampus represents spatial location and head
direction.
d. Some neural activity in the prefrontal cortex represents an absent stimulus in
working memory.
But the following are true:
e. In the Neural Representation Fiction, some neural activity in V1 represents
edges and lines.
f. In the Neural Representation Fiction, some neural activity in the fusiform
gyrus represents faces.
g. In theNeuralRepresentationFiction, someneural activity in thehippocampus
represents spatial location and head direction.
h. In the Neural Representation Fiction, some neural activity in the prefrontal
cortex represents an absent stimulus in working memory.
In familiar ûction, e.g. the Sherlock Holmes stories, there is a written body of text
that supplies the ûction. his text determines what is, and isn’t, true according
to the ûction. For NRF, there is no such text. Instead, the Neural Representation
Fiction should be understood as the best agreed theory about what neural states
represent. his theory is implicit in the practice of cognitive science. Within that
practice, researchers judge that certain neural states represent certain stimuli. In
some cases, there is agreement that certain neural states represent, and about their
representational content. here is also agreement about high-level features of the
practice such as the kind of evidence suõcient to justify ascription of neural rep-
resentation. To the extent that there is any agreement in the practice of cognitive
science about judgements concerning neural representation, that practice can be
taken as an implicit theory, which I will call the Neural Representation Fiction.
he relevant practice is a work-in-progress that will change as cognitive science
develops. For many neural states, current practice is silent about whether, or what,
they represent. Where the practice of cognitive science does not aòord a coherent
or determinate judgement about whether a neural state is a representation with a
particular content, we can say that the relevant judgement, according to the Neural
Representation Fiction, is (at least for themoment) undetermined. Where there is
agreement in the practice, we can say that there is a fact about neural representation
according to theNeuralRepresentation Fiction. Concerning how agreement brought
about, I suggest that NRF defer to cognitive science. Cognitive science has its own
standards for reaching agreement onwhat is or isn’t a neural representation. It is not
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NRF’s role to codify cognitive science’s standards, or attempt to impose standards
from outside. he Neural Representation Fiction is constituted by what best agreed
practice in cognitive science takes the facts about neural representation to be, where
what is meant by best is best according to the standards for systematising that
practice internal to cognitive science.
Now that we have laid out the basic strategy of NRF, there are many options for
how the details of the view could be developed. Following Yablo (2001), onemight
distinguish at least the following options:
instrumentalism:
the speaker is not ‘really’ asserting anything about neural representations,
only pretending to do so.
meta-fictionalism:
the speaker is ‘really’ asserting that according to the Neural Representation
Fiction, the neural representations are so and so.
object-fictionalism:
the speaker is ‘really’ asserting that the world is in a certain condition, namely,
the condition it needs to be in to make it true in the Neural Representation
Fiction that the neural representations are so and so.
figuralism:
the speaker is ‘really’ asserting that something is in a certain condition, but
perhaps not the world; the neural representations are functioning as repres-
entational aids in a ûgurative description of something else (the Ys), where
the Ys may themselves be representational aids invoked to help us describe
still further objects.7
here is also a range of further Fictionalist options for developing NRF. For ex-
ample, van Fraassen (1980) argues that scientiûc theories should be understood as
aiming at acceptance rather than belief, where acceptance is an attitude that falls
short of belief. Yablo (2006) andHinckfuss (1993) endorse a pragmatics/semantics
distinction and argue that Fictional contexts are those in which certain assumptions
are pragmatically presupposed. Eklund (2005) proposes that in certain contexts we
make claims but remain indiòerent to some of the implications expressed, including
existential implications.
In this paper, I do not wish to privilege any one of these options for developing NRF
over the others. My intention is instead to scout the general terrain of NRF and to
raise two problems that apply to any form of NRF.
7. Summary of the options taken from Eklund (2011).
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5 Objections to NRF
he promise of NRF is to let cognitive science enjoy the beneûts of neural-
representation talk without the cost of ontological commitment to natural
representations. Two obvious tests of adequacy of NRF are: (a) whether NRF really
allows us to avoid the task of naturalising representation; (b) whether NRF can
yield the same beneûts for cognitive science as Realism. In this section, I argue that
NRF faces two objections that seem to show that it cannot meet either adequacy
condition.
5.1 NRF doesn’t avoid the task of naturalising representation
NRF, like all forms of Fictionalism, presupposes that a ûction exists. In the case
of NRF, this is the Neural Representation Fiction. he ûctions used by NRF and
other forms of Fictionalism are, by their nature, representations: they represent the
world as thus and so. hese ûctions must be representational in order for it to be
true, according to the Fiction, that the world is thus and so; or, for us to accept, or
pragmatically endorse, the state of the world according to the Fiction.
A view that adopted a Fictionalist stance towards all representation talk—call it
Global Representation Fictionalism—would be incoherent. Suppose this form of
Fictionalism claimed to avoid ontological commitment to any representations; all
talk of representation should be understood as true only according to a ûction.
An immediate problem is that this view cannot escape commitment to at least
one representation: the ûction that describes the representational facts. If this
representation were not to exist, the Fictionalist stance would not make any sense.
A truly Global Representation Fictionalism is, therefore, not viable.
NRF is not Global Representation Fictionalism, but NRF is vulnerable to a related
worry. As mentioned in Section 3, it is widely assumed that neural representations
aremore fundamental than, and somehow ground, other representations. Neural
representations ground, and are responsible for, personal-level thoughts such as
beliefs, desires, intentions. Personal-level representations in turn ground conven-
tional representations such as signs,maps, and public language (Grice 1957; Lewis
1969).
For themoment, let us assume that NRF is correct. If NRF is correct, then there
are no such things as neural representations: neural-representation talk should be
understood as describing entities that occur in ûction. But if neural representations
do not exist, then the grounding claim must be false. Neural representations cannot
play the role of grounding other representations if they do not exist. One cannot use
a ûctional entity to ground (constitute, realise, or otherwise bring into existence) a
13
real entity. Personal-level thought and conventional representations would have to
be grounded in some other way.
here appear to be two options for an advocate of NRF at this point.8 First, keep the
grounding claim. he way to do this appears to be to broaden the scope of NRF to
bring other representations into the ûctional domain. One could adopt a ûctionalist
stance towards personal-level intentional states and conventional representations as
well as to neural representations. his would allow the grounding claim to come
out as true concerning the entities in the relevant ûctional domain. Unfortunately,
this strategy quickly runs into diõculties. As we saw above, NRF is committed
to the existence of at least one representation, theNeural Representation Fiction.
Hence, the grounding claim must be false at least for this representation. If the
Neural Representation Fiction exists, it cannot be grounded in non-existent entities.
But if this one ûction is real, it is utterly bewildering how it can exist by itself. In
Section 4,we said that theNeural Representation Fiction is made up of the thoughts,
intentions, judgements, and beliefs of cognitive scientists. his account of theNeural
Representation Fiction is not available on the current strategy; none of the above-
mentioned representations exist, so they cannot make up theNeural Representation
Fiction. An advocate of NRF is le with the problem of explaining how and why
the Neural Representation Fiction exists as the lone sui generis real representation.
And to the extent that an advocate of NRF admits other representations in order to
explain theNeuralRepresentation Fiction, shewill is forced to give up the grounding
claim for them.
his leads to the second option: drop the grounding claim. hiswould allowus to keep
personal-level intentional states and conventional representations. If one wished,
personal-level thoughts could still ground conventional representations. One could
also allow the Neural Representation Fiction to bemade up from personal-level
intentional states and conventional representations. One would have to give up,
however, the claim that personal-level intentional states and conventional represent-
ations are grounded by neural representations. his strategy generates a diòerent
problem for NRF. he claimed beneût ofNRF was that it allowed us to avoid the
problem of naturalising representation. he current strategy leaves us with the
problem of explaining how, if the grounding claim is false, personal-level inten-
tional states and conventional representations gain their representational status and
content. he grounding claim was designed to answer this: it aimed to naturalise
personal-level intentional states and conventional representations via neural rep-
resentations. But on the current strategy, this answer is no longer available. NRF
understood this way reintroduces, with full force, the problem of naturalising rep-
resentation. he original problem is transformed from that of naturalising neural
8. A third option, Fictionalism about grounding claims, will not be discussed here. I assume
that any claim involving grounding should be understood in a Realist vein.
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representations to naturalising the personal-level representations and conventional
representations on which the Fictionalist reading of neural-representation talk de-
pends. he upshot is that NRF does not allow us to avoid the task of naturalising
representation.
Howmight an advocate ofNRF respond? One option is to argue that personal-level
intentional states or conventional representations will prove easier to naturalise
than neural representations. It is an open question whether the naturalising project
should start with neural representations, personal-level thoughts, or conventional
representations. here is some recent work that appears to show that beginning
with conventional representations, without taking a detour through neural repres-
entations, has some promise.9 If this were to prove to correct, then perhaps this
objection to NRF can be deected.
5.2 NRF doesn’t serve cognitive science as well as Realism
Neural representations are used by cognitive science for prediction, description,
intervention, causation, and explanation. A key test for NRF, as for any form of
Fictionalism, is whether it delivers the goods; whether the Fictionalist construal of
the discourse in question serves our interests just as well as Realism. NRF promises
fewer ontological commitments while yielding the same beneûts as Realism—can it
deliver on this?
At least some of the roles of neural representation in cognitive science appear apt
to be served by ûctional neural representations just as well as by real representa-
tions. Fictional neural representations appear to be able to serve cognitive science’s
interests for prediction. Just because an entity is ûctional does not bar it from being
useful in generating predictions. Fictions are oen used to generate predictions.
In electrostatics, one might assume the existence of ûctional mirror charges for
generating predictions about the behaviour of real bodies. Fictional neural rep-
resentations also appear apt to serve cognitive science’s interests for description.
Descriptions need not be true in order to feature in our best theories. he kinetic
theory of gases is one of our best descriptive theories even though the entities that
it posits—hard, perfectly-elastic, billiard-ball-like atoms—do not exist. Fictional
neural representations also appear apt to serve cognitive science’s interests for inter-
vention. Interventions guided by ûctions can be just as successful as those guided
by truth. Fictitious forces (the Coriolis force, the centrifugal force, the Euler force)
may enter into our deliberation alongside real forces when we intervene on Earth-
bound dynamical systems. he fact that these forces are ûctitious does not make
9. See Skyrms (2010). However, see Cao (2012) and Godfrey-Smith (2012) for an argument that
Skyrms’ view can be turned to the service of naturalising neural representation.
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our interventions any less successful.
Fulûlling the causal and explanatory roles of neural representations in cognitive
science appears to pose amore serious challenge for NRF. Let us take these two
roles in turn.
First, causal role. In cognitive science, neural representations are assumed to be
causes of behaviour and cognitive activity. Prima facie, this role for neural rep-
resentations appears to be incompatible with their ûctional status. In order for
something to be a cause, that entitymust exist. Fictional entities cannot cause, only
real entities cause. herefore, NRF appears unable to accommodate at least this role
of neural-representation talk in cognitive science.
his objection to NRFmay be less worrying than it may ûrst seem. An advocate of
NRF can reply that talking as if neural representations have a causal role is useful,
even if false. One beneût of this talk is that it provides uswith away of referring to the
(real) neural causes of behaviour. According to NRF, attribution of representational
properties to neural states is systematically false. Yet, attributing representational
properties to neural states, even if false, provides a way of labelling neural states,
and hence of keeping track of them. We can use these (ûctional) labels as a way
to refer to the underlying neural states, just as if we had given the neural states
proper names. So even if it is false that neural representations cause behaviour, it can
still be useful to assert this because it allows us to express—using the handy set of
ûctional labels that NRF provides—true causal relationships between neural states
and behaviour. his oòers at least one strategy for reconciling NRF with cognitive
science’s ascription of causal roles to neural representations.¹0
Second, the explanatory role of neural representations. his is more diõcult for
NRF to accommodate. As described in Section 3, one of the primary functions of
neural-representation talk is to explain patterns of success and failure associated
with animal cognition. Neural-representation talk is assumed to provide the best
explanation ofmany cognitive phenomena. But, if ascribing neural representations
is the best explanation of those cognitive phenomena, then according to Inference to
the Best Explanation (IBE),we should believe that such ascriptions are true. However,
this is atly incompatible with NRF.
his objection to NRF can be summarised as follows:
1. Our best explanation of certain cognitive phenomena involve appeal to neural
10. Note that this indicates a potential strength of NRF with respect to Realism about neural-
representation talk: NRF allows us to avoid Kim (1998)’s exclusion problem for representational
properties. here is no threat that neural and representational causes systematically overdetermine
behaviour, because talk of representational causes is really just ameans of expressing a truth about
neural causes.
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representations.
2. We ought rationally to be believe that our best explanations are true (IBE).
3. herefore, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of neural representa-
tions.
he objection reveals an incompatibility between NRF and two ideas that are cent-
ral to cognitive science: (1) neural representations best explain many cognitive
phenomena, and (2) Inference to the Best Explanation.
How can NRF get around this? here appear to be two options, both of which have
serious costs.
he ûrst option is reject (1). On this option, onewould not claim that ascribing neural
representations is the bestway of explaining the relevant cognitive phenomena. his
could keep IBE (premise 2) intact. he downside is that this strategy cuts against
themotivation for NRF. We saw in Section 3 that one of the primary roles ascribed
to neural representations is as the best explanation of cognitive phenomena. If we
reject this and keep IBE, then it is incumbent on us to show that a better explanation
exists of the relevant phenomena that avoids appeal to neural representations. But
this was precisely the challenge that stymied Eliminativism and which NRF claimed
to avoid. If NRF requires us to ûnd a better non-representational cognitive science,
then it is unclear what advantage NRF has over Eliminativism.
he second option is reject (2). his could be done in a number ofways. Oneway is to
downplay the importance of explanation in science in general, as does van Fraassen
(1980; 1985). On this view, explanation plays a relativelyminor role in scientiûc prac-
tice compared to that of prediction, description, and intervention; good explanation
is not a particularly signiûcant matter as far as our ontological commitments are
concerned. Alternatively, onemight keep the importance of explanation in cognitive
science, but break the link between truth and best explanation. his option appears
to ût with recent work on scientiûcmodels as explanatory ûctions (Bokulich 2011,
2012; Frigg 2010a, 2010b). On such a view, explanatory value remains important,
but it can be provided by a ûction just as well as by truth. he cost of both strategies
is that cognitive science has to reject IBE. his appears to be a heavy cost indeed.
IBE is one of the primary inferential methods in cognitive science. Our knowledge
of internal cognition is based almost entirely on what best explains the behavioural
and neural data. If are not justiûed in inferring the truth of the best explanation of
this data, then we appear to know almost nothing in cognitive science. his seems
too high a price to pay for NRF.
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6 Conclusion
We have seen that NRF faces at least two objections. hese objections concern (i)
whether NRF avoids the task of naturalising representation, and (ii) whether NRF
adequately serves the interests of cognitive science. Both objections aòect NRF
independently of the exact form of Fictionalism that NRF employs.
Concerning (i), the best option for NRF appears to be to argue that the task of
naturalising representation is on ûrmer ground with conventional representations
or personal-level thoughts than it is with neural representations. Concerning (ii),
NRF faces an unpleasant choice: either do the Eliminativist’swork for her, or jettison
IBE from cognitive science. Neither option is palatable. Perhaps the best strategy
for an advocate of NRF is to ûnd reasons for rejecting IBE in the case of neural
representations that do not apply to other areas of cognitive science where IBE is
employed. However, at this stage it far from clear what those reasons could be.
his article is only a ûrst step in the exploration of NRF. he objections above
indicate that further work is needed to show that NRF can deliver on its promise to
have beneûts over Realism and Eliminativism about neural-representation talk.
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